Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Master's Theses

Graduate School

March 2020

The Indigenous Communal Sense in Enrique Dussel's Concept of
People
Erick Javier Padilla
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses
Part of the Caribbean Languages and Societies Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons,
and the Latin American Literature Commons

Recommended Citation
Padilla, Erick Javier, "The Indigenous Communal Sense in Enrique Dussel's Concept of People" (2020).
LSU Master's Theses. 5061.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/5061

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

THE INDIGENOUS COMMUNAL SENSE IN ENRIQUE
DUSSEL’S CONCEPT OF PEOPLE

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Lousiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
The Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies

by
Erick Javier Padilla
B.A., University of Puerto Rico, 2018
May 2020

To my parents Magaly and Henry, my brother, my fiancée, and my whole family and
friends. Also, to the vocation of politics and political philosophy.

ii

Table of Contents
Abstract .................................................................................................................................. iv
Chapter 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 1
1.1. Thesis Structure ........................................................................................................ 4
Chapter 2. The Origin of the Concept of People .................................................................... 7
2.1. Introduction to the Tojol ob’al Community ............................................................. 8
2.2. Communal Life and Organization in the K’iche’ Indigenous Community .............. 9
2.3. Collective Experience in the runa/jaqi of Andean Indigenous Communities ....... 12
2.4. The Tojol ab’al ‘We’ .............................................................................................. 16
2.5. How Communal Life Is Lived ............................................................................... 19
2.6. Command by Obeying ........................................................................................... 26
2.7. Delegation of Political Power ................................................................................ 27
2.8. Conclusion.............................................................................................................. 30
Chapter 3. The Concept of People in Light of the Indigenous Communal Sense ................ 32
3.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 32
3.2. An Imaginary Context ............................................................................................ 36
3.3. The Hegemonic Demand and the Rise of the People............................................. 39
3.4. The Concept of People in the Midst of Globalization ........................................... 42
3.5. The Oblivion of the ‘We’: The Origin of the Scission of Political Power ............. 45
3.6. The Power of the People: From Potentia to Potestas ............................................ 46
3.7. Conclusion.............................................................................................................. 49
Chapter 4. The Origin of the People as the Other than Political Power ............................... 52
4.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 52
4.2. The People as Social Bloc ...................................................................................... 53
4.3. The People as the Other of the Corrupted System ................................................. 55
4.4. From Fetishized Power to People’s Advent: The Origin of the New System ....... 59
4.5. The State of Rebellion and the Case of Puerto Rico .............................................. 62
4.6. Conclusion.............................................................................................................. 64
Chapter 5. Conclusion: The Possibilities of a New System ................................................. 66
5.1. New Challenges...................................................................................................... 67
Works Cited .......................................................................................................................... 70
Vita ....................................................................................................................................... 72

iii

Abstract
In Twenty Theses on Politics, Argentine-Mexican philosopher Enrique Dussel compares the
concept of people with two Indigenous terms: The Aztec altepetl and the Mayan Amaq’.
Both concepts mean ‘community’ or ‘people,’ and ‘us/we.’ However, beyond his reference
to Carlos Lenkersdorf’s book Filosofar en clave tojolabal (Philosophizing in Tojolabal
Code), Dussel delves not further into these Indigenous words and their implications to
understand what he means by people. Focusing on the work of Carlos Lenkersdorf (2005),
Gladys Tzul Tzul (2018), Alejandra Aquino Moreschi (2013), Raúl Madrid (2014) and
Josef Estermann (2006), I shall examine how the political proceeding of distinct Latin
American Indigenous communities, literally changes the manner in which Dussel’s concept
of people is understood in non-Indigenous realities. Indeed, among Indigenous peoples, a
search for an alternative political system is commonplace. I will examine that search
especially in the Tojol ab’al, K’iche’, and Andean instance; and, taking guidance from
Dussel’s notion of people, I will examine how there may be a solution to be found in the
political participation of the citizenry made by consensus. This political resolution may, in
turn, be instrumental in the creation of a new notion of the ‘we’ in non-Indigenous realities.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
The category of people, which is not often regarded as a scientific interpretive
category, and less sociological, is, I think, a true category of interpretation. Much
broader, ambivalent and therefore richer category than many other categories used.
-- Enrique Dussel, Filosofía ética latinoamericana 6/III
Through this thesis project I aim to evaluate the concept of people brought by ArgentineMexican philosopher Enrique Dussel in Twenty Thesis on Politics.1 Even though there are
few Western philosophers who worked and are engaged with the concept of people (i.e.
Maurice Blanchot, Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, Jean-Luc Nancy, and others) Dussel
acknowledges that the people, as a concept and as a reality, must be interpreted and defined
by Latin American political theorists and philosophers who care for Latin American
political and social reality. Then, Latin America is at the center of what Dussel understands
by people, and this thesis project cannot be comprehended if it is not through a receptive
attitude towards the sense of community in some Latin American specific contexts.2
As we will analyze, some Latin American Indigenous communities tend to live the
sense of unity. For instance, the ‘us/we’ of the Tojol ab’al Indigenous community of

Enrique Dussel’s concept of people begins to be developed in Para una ética de la liberación
latinoamericana (1973) volumes one to three; the third volume is titled Filosofía Ética Latinoamericana. De
la erótica a la pedagógica de la liberación (1977). Few years later, Dussel writes La producción teórica de
Marx (1985) and Hacia un Marx desconocido: Un comentario de los manuscritos del 61-63 (1988) in which
he returns again to the concept of people. Finally, and more recently, Dussel published an article on populism
titled “Cinco tesis sobre ‘populismo’” in his book Filosofas el sur. Descolonizacion y transmodernidad
(2015). The reason I concentrate most of my analysis of the concept of people on Twenty Thesis on Politics is
because this book constitutes, for the most part, a study of politics through Dussel’s understanding of what the
people are. *I am in debt with the Chilean historian Gabriel Salazar who share with me the above information
on Dussel’s history, approach and development of the concept of people.
1

2

It is worth noting, the concept people has a Latin American connotation not only because it resembles the
Indigenous sense of community but because in Latin America the people (el pueblo, in Spanish), as it does the
community, represents a unique sense of familiarity (familiaridad), unity, and collaborative work around
familiar and non-familiar members. See Gladys Tzul Tzul, “Sistemas de gobierno comunal indígena: La
organización de la reproducción de la vida,” Epistemologías del Sur, Edited by María Paula Meneses and
Karina Bidaseca. CLASCO, 2018.

1

Chiapas, Mexico, represents a vivid example of how communal work and daily life
interactions shape the cosmovision of some Indigenous communities practicing
complementarity and unity of their members in order to survive.3 The people act in a
similar way. As we will see, the people always behave as a community willing to survive.
In fact, our evaluation of the dynamism of the concept of people could represent a unique
analysis of social protests in the Puerto Rican instance and the role the participation of the
citizenry, especially the most vulnerable and affected ones, constitute and how they
resemble the reality of Indigenous communities when they are not heard as individuals.4
However, the people are not defined by the quantity of members they have. On the other
hand, how the members of the community decide what is better for the community will
determine if they act as a ‘we,' as a people. Thus, the concept of people is a
conceptualization of what can be identified in a political active moment upon a specific
group and its participants. Dussel will guide us to acknowledge how the people act and why
they act as they do.
In addition, in this thesis the ‘I’ of Western consciousness will not have the
significance of the ‘we’. The ‘we’ functions, at least for the Tojol ab’al, as a characteristic
that gives limits to the leader ‘I’. This sense of ‘we’ overcomes egotism by fizzling any
type of self-recognition in the political area. Also, the ‘we’ challenges the ethics of Western

3

Although there are many Indigenous communities in Latin America which can be included in this thesis
project, I decided to dedicate my attention to the Tojolabal community, as studied by Carlos Lenkerdorf
(2005). However, I will present the work of Gladys Tzul Tzul (2018), Alejandra Aquino Moreschi (2013),
Raúl Madrid (2014) and Josef Estermann (2006) to introduce the reader to the work of other academics
studying, for instance, Guatemalan and Andean Indigenous communities where the sense of community is
comparable or juxtaposed to the Tojolabal.
4

In this thesis project, I will briefly study the social protest that took place in Puerto Rico during the summer
of 2019.

2

society by focusing not in the individual but in the collective. For this reason, it is worth
pointing out straight away that another characteristic of the people is their aiming to reach
one goal by working together. This action of working together cannot leave behind neither
women nor men, neither able-bodied persons nor disabled ones, and so forth.

As we will see, the concept of people not only give the characteristics of what
constitutes the people but how they appear in political reality. Dussel opens the discussion
with an approach on why the people are outside the current political system and are those
capable of establishing a new one. The people, indeed, as were recognized not as
participants of political decisions, then, they represent the alterity of the system, the Other
of the political organism. Thus, the people constitute the principle of political
responsibility. That is, without the participation of the people, politics does not enact its
ethical power and politicians are not responsible with their capacity to serve, hear, and
receive orders.

For Dussel, democratic politicians should follow orders from the people, who are
those who, living outside the political system, have clearer minds to contemplate a new
system.

Dussel writes,

Distant thinkers, those who had a perspective of the center from the
periphery, those who had to define themselves in the presence of an
already established image of the human person and in the presence
of uncivilized fellow humans, the newcomers, the ones who hope

3

because they are always outside, these are the ones who have a clear
mind for pondering reality.5
Similarly, the people appear to reorganize and/or create a new system. However, they do
not work alone. The people have a broader understanding of the current system since they
come from below as a unit, a community, who experience the needs of their members and
how the current system does not promote the needs of these. It is the aim of the people to
commit themselves to reorganize society and take precedence over anything that means the
corruption of life.
Finally, it is fundamental to contextualize the scheme in which people and power
inhabits. For Dussel, the people are power. If the politicians recognize the existence of the
people, their responsibility is to address themselves to them. For Dussel, politicians ought
to preserve the life in all its forms, by paying obligatory attention to the life of their
communities. For this reason, according to Dussel, what should be considered for
administering a community as a politician is that the community is life represented by its
members and must be preserved through an obedience of their demands and human needs.
1.1. Thesis Structure
This thesis is divided in five chapters, including the Introduction (Chapter 1) and the
Conclusion (Chapter 5). The second chapter will investigate the sense of community in
some Mayan-Guatemalan and Andean communities in Latin America, paying special
attention to the concept of ‘we’ developed by Carlos Lenkersdorf (2005) through his
philosophical approach to the Mayan Indigenous community of Chiapas, Mexico, calls the

5

Enrique Dussel, Philosophy of Liberation, trans. By Aquilina Martinez and Christine Morkovsky, Orbis
books, Maryknoll, New York: 1985.

4

Tojol ab’al. Following the investigation of Lenkersdorf on the Tojol ab’al ‘we,’ which is
reflected in his book Filosofar en clave tojolabal (Philosophizing in Tojolabal Code) and
his article “Nosotros, otra realidad” (“We, Another Reality"), I will provide a concise
description of how this Mayan-Indigenous community of Chiapas live, share and practice
the notion of the community.
In chapter 3, I introduce the concept of people considering the communal and
political sense of power represented by Indigenous communities studied in chapter 2;
especially the Tojol ab’al. The idea of the people as power will be interpellated by the
exercise of delegation of power shared by Indigenous communities. However, as Dussel
points out, sometimes the delegation of power operates as the scission between the people
and their power. That is, those who receive the delegated power of the people became
susceptible to use this power for their own benefit. In light of this situation, the people
respond to the corruption of political power and seek to transform the system in agreement
to their will to live as a community.
Nevertheless, when political representatives save political power for their own
benefit, the people become excluded, and the Others of a political system based on the
capacities of the politicians not on the sense of community (chapter 4). The insistence of
the primacy or preeminence of the people upon their political representatives will set the
basis upon which we will explain the negative effects of the invalidated interaction between
the people and the internal government. When the internal government does not take care
of the demands of the people, the sense of community becomes null and void. Meanwhile,
as the political power does not function if it is not in community, it is fundamental to

5

approach the people as political power; this, subsequently, will make possible to evidence
the sense of responsibility in politics.

6

Chapter 2. The Origin of the Concept of People
The Aztec term altepetl and the Mayan term Amaq’ refer to the ‘community’ or the
pueblo, and even vividly to the ‘we’ that has been forgotten by modern, Western
experience. As a result, in Latin America – through the indigenous influence that
permeates the continent – the word pueblo means something more profound than
merely ‘the people’ in romance languages.
-- Enrique Dussel, Twenty Theses on Politics
The Spanish word pueblo (people) evolved from the Latin word populus which means
“human community.”6 However, according to Argentine-Mexican philosopher Enrique
Dussel, the people, as a concept, receives a special meaning depending on the social
context where it is utilized. For instance, Dussel argues that the concept of people in Latin
America can be associated with the Aztec altepetl and the Mayan Amaq’ which describe the
importance and the sense of unity in Indigenous communities.7 In the Aztecs and Mayan
socio-political reality, the community is part of the lifestyle and even the language.8 Hence,
Latin America had and has a definition of people influenced by the strong Indigenous
socio-political organization. In order to investigate more deeply what the indigenous
influence consists on, in this chapter I introduce the sense of communality in three Latin
American Indigenous societies, emphasizing my analysis on the Tojol ab’al, K’iche’, and
Andean contexts. In view of the verticality of most of the prevailing political systems in the

6

Michiel de Vaan, Etymological Dictionary of Latin and Other Italic Languages, Leiden, Boston, 2008. P.
480.
7

Enrique Dussel, Twenty Theses on Politics. Translated by George Ciccariello-Maher, Duke University Press,
2008. Hereafter cited as “TTP” followed by page number. TTP, 74.
Also, for more information on the altepetl see Laura E. Matthew, chapter 4 “The Primacy of Place: Ciudad
Vieja as Indian Town & Colonial Altepetl,” Memories of Conquest: Becoming Mexicano in Colonial
Guatemala, University of North Carolina Press, 2012.
For more information on the Amaq’ see Gladys Tzul Tzul, “Sistemas de gobierno comunal indígena: La
organización de la reproducción de la vida,” Epistemologías del Sur, edited by María Paula Meneses and
Karina Bidaseca, CLACSO, 2018.
8

For more information on how language contains the sense of community in the Mayan-Tojolabal Indigenous
see Carlos Lenkersdorf, chapter 3 “El NOSOTROS palabra-clave” and chapter 6 “El NOSOTROS y la
lingüística,” Filosofar en clave tojolabal, Miguel Ángel Porrúa, México, 2005.
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world, there is good reason to make a case for re-evaluating political organization towards
the future following the meaning and the communal sense of this Latin American
Indigenous communities.
2.1. Introduction to the Tojol ob’al Community
In 1972 the German philosopher Carlos Lenkersdorf went to Chiapas, Mexico, to coexist
with the tojolabales. In one communal meeting he attended, the tojolabales repeated
numerous times the word -tik. The repetition of this word caught his attention, even though
the repetition of words and terms in conversations among the members of this Indigenous
community is common (run-of-the-mill, to be more specific) and does not have a special
meaning.9 In fact, the repetition of words in Tzeltal, the Mayan language spoken by the
tojolabales is not uncommon since this language has only 300 words. However,
Lenkersdorf was impressed by the word -tik which is not only part of the Tojol ab’al
vocabulary, but also a result of the communal lifestyle.10 Lenkersdorf explains in his article
“Nosotros, otra realidad” (“We, Another Reality”) that the catholic priest of the community
he was visiting told him that the word -tik can be translated as ‘we’ or ‘us.’11 Interestingly
enough, the constant repetition of the -tik eclipses the prominence the ‘I’ has in Western
contexts.12 The -tik or ‘we’ points toward a certain lack of interest the Tojol ab’al

As Jill Brody (2004) states, “el alto nivel de repeticón es típico de la plática cotidiana entre personas
íntimas” (p. 75). For more information on the notion of repetition in the Tzeltal language see Jill Brody,
“Comunidad es familia, acuerdo es repetición: Relación entre dos metáforas claves en tojol ab’al,” La
metáfora en mesoaméric, edited by Mercedes Montes de Oca Vega, Universidad Nacinoal Autónoma de
México, México, 2004.
9

Carlos Lenkersdorf, “Nosotros, otra realidad,” Comunicação & política, n.s., v. VII, n. 2, p. 161-079. My
translation. Hereafter cited as “NOR” followed by page number. All translations are mine. NOR, 161
11
For practical purposes, I will use the word ‘we’ referring to what Lenkersdorf writes as nosotros.
10

12

I will say that if the majority of Western languages follows a self-referential understanding of the world
through the use of language, as it is meant by the ego cogito (I think) of the French philosopher René

8

community has on living individually and selfishly. For the tojolabales, human needs to
live with others in order to survive. Community requires represents unity, security, and
thus, life. Then, the tojolabales through their language points toward a new dimension of
inter- and intrapersonal relationships, where complementarity and unity are at the center.
However, to imply that just the tojolabales has the notion of complementarity, unity, and
the ‘we’ briefly displayed above would not do justice to what Dussel writes in the quote I
introduced at the beginning of the chapter. Hence, before explaining a little bit more in
depth what the sense of the ‘we’ means for the Tojol ab’al community, I want to introduce
other voices to the sense of communal live and organization in other Indigenous
communities in Latin America.
2.2. Communal Life and Organization in the K’iche’ Indigenous Community
As Indigenous scholar of Guatemala, Gladys Tzul Tzul makes evident in her article
“Sistemas de gobierno comunal indígena: La organización de la reproducción de la vida”
(“Indigenous Community Governance Systems: The Organization of the Reproduction of
Life”), it is crucial and even fundamental to contemplate through a communal code and
standpoint what is Indigenous. Because most of the indigenous communities in Latin
America has survived together battles and confrontations against traders and even political
authorities who want to turn Indigenous lands into private properties to subtract or use
material resources from them, the sense of unity and family constitutes and forges an
occasion for communities to survive. As Tzul writes in her article,
The struggle has been constant and while they resist expropriation,
they produce legal-political strategies to control the concrete means
Descartes, the communal -tik adds a new moment for inter-philosophical dialogues on communal life and its
interpellation to the I’s standpoint for interpreting reality.

9

for their daily life, organize massive communal and religious
festivals, make requests to ask for rain or to thank for the harvest,
they self-regulate themselves and also on several occasions have
dismissed their authorities when they fail to comply with the
decisions produced in the assemblies.13

For the K’iche’, the Mayan-Indigenous community of Guatemala Tzul belongs to, the
Indigenous sense of community involves religious ceremonies, chants, and festivities
around the theme of nature as a whole and as a mother; the place where all of us live and
reproduce in. The communal governance system the K’iche’ practices, is based in
assemblies organized by and for the community, where women and men reach consensus
concerning daily affairs and the distribution of caring for the land.
Because defending the land is a constant demand for assuring life, all concrete
means having relation with the survival of the community ought to be protected. Gladys
states,
When I say concrete means for the reproduction of life, I mean the
territory and all that contains it, to say: water, roads, forests,
cemeteries, schools, sacred places, rituals; in short, the concrete and
symbolic wealth that communities produce and govern through a
series of strategies guided from a specific space and time that are
structured from each unit of reproduction.14

Life in all its dimensions is not taken for granted for the K’iche’. The community plays the
role of defending life, so it is life which dwells at the center of the community. It forges
political and social structures, the agricultural system, the familiar organization, and even

“Sistemas de gobierno comunal indígena: La organización de la reproducción de la vida,” Epistemologías
del Sur, edited by María Paula Meneses and Karina Bidaseca, CLACLSO, 2018. Hereafter cited as “SGCI”
followed by page number. All translations are mine. SGCI, 385.
14
SGCI, 386.
13
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the manner in which service is practice. For Tzul, the power of the community is in the
service: k’ax k’ol.15
K’ax K’ol denotes the work or service (k’ol) as something that is painful (k’ax) but
practiced in community. All men, women, and children are committed with the k’ax k’ol as
it is part of everyday life for the K’iche’ and necessary for the sustainability and
reproduction of life in all its dimensions within and outside the community. Also,
communal work guides the decision-making process and the political coordination the
community practices with itself and other communities, and the organization of festivities
to celebrate life or mourn and lament the loss of any loved one.16 Of these aspects or
characteristics of communal life which are affected by the service provided by the K’iche’,
I want to stop briefly on the decision-making process and how it is practiced by this Mayan
community.
The K’iche’ people have a communal authority formed by some political officials
elected every year in communal assemblies. Every man and woman of the community has
the responsibility to participate in the assemblies since the decisions made are reach by
collective consensus. In the communal assemblies the community can decide how to
reforest the woodland and with what species, how to organized rallies or protest and defend
their lands, how to divide the k’ax k’ol, and so on.17 Depending on what is the purpose or
the necessity of holding an assembly, the community could celebrate extraordinary

15

SGCI, 388.

16

According to Tzul there are four types of communal work: Service as a way of decision, service as a way of
coordination, service as a manner to organize a festivity, and service as a way to overcome pain. For more
information see SGCI, 390.
17
SGCI, 394.
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meetings where they discuss urgent concerns and issues of relevance to the survival of the
community. What is significant here is that assemblies are self-conveyed by the community
whenever it demands so or when the situation requires immediate action.
This decision-making process is not different than the one proposed by the Tojol
ab’al and Andean Indigenous communities. For instance, the Andean runa/jaqi, that is, the
collective experience of the Andean people, forges a concrete and symbolic cosmovision
that affects the political realm of the Andean Indigenous communities.18 Josef Ertermann in
his book Filosofía andina: Sabiduría indígena para un mundo nuevo (Andean Philosophy:
Indigenous Wisdom for a New World) reflects on this collective experiential linking
Indigenous communities of the Andes have for experiencing reality and forge communal
everydayness.
2.3. Collective Experience in the runa/jaqi of Andean Indigenous Communities
The experience of unity in collectives is also found in Andean Indigenous communities
around the experience of runa/jaqi. The runa/jaqi as Estermann defines it is “the concrete
and collective experience of the Andean human in his physic and symbolic universe.”19 The
Andean who Estermann associates with the runa/jaqi speaks Quechua or Aymara, and
evolved from the Incan empire called Tawantinsuyu.20 Whether in the organization of

18

Josef Estermann, Filosofía andina: Sabiduría indígena para un mundo nuevo, 2da. Ed. La Paz: ISEAT,
2006. Hereafter cited as “FA” followed by page number. All translations are mine. FA, 74.
19
FA, 74.
According to Estermann, “this empire called “Tawantinsuyu” (‘the four regions’) had even extended from
Anqasmayu river, in the Knot of the Pasto in Colombia, in the north, until the Chilean Central Valley,
between Maule and Biobio rivers, in the south. From the Pacific coast to the Amazonian Ceja de Selva, and
the areas of Tucuman and Mendoza in northwest Argentina. Thus, it practically became a Pan-Andean
imperial state.” FA, 69.
20

12

communal work or the ayllu (peasant community),21 the communal experience of the
runa/jaqi is present and in operation up to date.
Runa, which in Quechua literally means ‘human being,’ and jaqi, which is the
Aymaran word for ‘person’ or ‘human being,’ represent for Estermann the Andean
communal sense of living in the Andean region.22 The sense of community for the Andean
dwells around symbols, religious ceremonies, and the manner in which the people interact
between them.23 As we briefly saw with the Tojol ab’al community, the language is part of
the communal organization and structure. But language is neither for the Tojol ab’al nor for
the Andean Indigenous the only way of expressing intrapersonal relationships and cohesion
within communal lives. The lived experience of the runa/jaqi consists not in what you can
say as an individual but in what can be shared with the community as part of it. For
instance, in reference to the lack of ‘philosophers’ or ‘critical theorists’ in Indigenous
communities of the Andes Estermann explains that “the true philosophical subject is the
anonymous and collective runa/jaqi, the Andean human being with his/her collective and
unconscious experiential inheritance, the great community of human beings, related in time
and space for a common experience and interpretation.”24 In other words, what is valued by
the Andeans Indigenous communities is the shared and coexisted experience of the
runa/jaqi.

As Estermann states, “there is no exact translation of the quechuamara word ayllu: on the one hand, it is an
ethnic unity of the Andean peasant community, on the other hand, the extended family, and on another sense
the people [pueblo] or the village [aldea] in a geographic (mark’a) sense” FA, 220; [my emphasis].
21

22

FA, 65.

23

FA, 78.
FA, 87.

24
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The preeminence of the collective and common is such that to imagine myself as a
self-sustaining individual or even disown of my participation in the community is to
deprive myself of existence. In Estermann words,
the individual as such is a 'nothing' (a 'non-being'), is something
totally lost if not inserted into a network of multiple relationships. If
a person no longer belongs to the local community (ayllu), because
he was expelled or because he has opted it out by his own act, it is
as if he no longer existed; an isolated and unrelated person is a
(socially) dead entity.25

The runa/jaqi disvalues any type of egoism since there is nothing outside the network of
ties unifying human beings with others. The ties of relation for the runa/jaqi are
fundamental at such a level that, for instance, a transcendental and unrelated God is
unimaginable or unconceivable for the Andean Indigenous.26 Thus, even God is a related
being; as the Andeans are.27
For this reason, the principle of correspondence is fundamental in the runa/jaqi
context. As Estermann states, “’Correspondence’ (con + respondere) etymologically implies
a correlation, a mutual and bidirectional relation between two ‘fields’ [campos] of
‘reality’.”28 Nothing in the Andean world is an independent ‘being’ or exists independently.
Correspondence and co-existence are always actively playing in humans-to-humans,

25

FA, 110.

26

FA, 128.

27

For Estermann, “the Andean ‘ontology’ is always an ‘inter-ontology’” (FA, 128).

28

FA, 128.
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humans-to-God, humans-to-nature relations. This is so since the relation between two or
more parts or lives forges or creates the Andean runa/jaqi.
It is worth nothing that in the runa/jaqi the existence of differences does not
eliminate the principle of correspondence. The Andean cosmovision allows two distinct or
different parts to co-exist as a part of a whole that can be interpreted and is relational with
the Tojol ab’al indigenous ‘we’ as we will see shortly. The correspondence and coexistence proposed by the Andean Indigenous runa/jaqi follows the principle of the ‘we;’ a
‘we’ that along Guillermo Meza Salcedo argues:
No matter if we speak different languages, have particular customs,
even opposing ideologies, and so the concept of ‘we’ has changed,
however, we are not the Spaniards, nor the Portuguese, nor the
American, nor the Amerindian but ‘we’ are all the human beings
who inhabit this planet Earth.29

This sense of ‘we’ has not borders but the whole world, a Pachamama, a world-mother,
where everyone may forge an Indigenous sense of community. However, one might be
wondering, is not the current globalization unifying different countries into a world-wide
economy, culture, commerce, and even universal history?30 We no longer have to settle for
what is taught at local schools since digital education navigates through social networks
and platforms that find no borders thanks to the internet and other digital sources of
information. The sense of distance is almost erased due to the efficiency of technological
devices capable of communicate two or more individuals even when they are

Guillermo Meza Salcedo, “El ‘vivir nosotros’ amerindio vs ‘decir nosotros’ de la globalización”,
Cuadernos de filosofía latinoamericana, Vol. 37, No. 114, pp. 151-166. 2016. Hereafter cited as “EVNA”
followed by page number. All translations are mine. EVNA, 161.
29
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geographically distanced. As Guillermo Meza Salcedo argues in “El ‘vivir nosotros’
amerindio vs ‘decir nosotros’ de la globalización” (“Amerindian ‘Living Us’ vs ‘Saying
Us’ of Globalization”), we begin to believe or “think that we are a united whole, that we are
next [próximo] and interconnected to each other, that there are neither distances nor barriers
between peoples and cultures.”31 However, globalization has threatened and sometimes
replaced direct, face-to-face contact between humans to bring distant relatives together. The
trouble is that this model not only unites those who are distant and alienates those who are
close, but also favors a vertical political system which creates a tense relationship between
indigenous communities and the nation state.
2.4. The Tojol ab’al ‘We’
When reaching to political decisions, the Tojol ab’al community shows no hierarchical
structure uniting not the voice of every individual. The leader does not stand out above
others since the ‘we’ leaves no space to operate the community in hierarchical systems;
especially, those which main purpose is to benefit a few above the majority.
The predominance of the ‘we’ in the decision-making process, avoids the Tojol
ab’al community falling into fraud and corruption, seen when social, political, and
economic status of a person prevails upon the decision-making political result.32 All the
community needs to participate to reach political consensus since the decisions made in
communal assemblies are to attend the necessities of all as a ‘we.’
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Just because the tojolabales do not make decisions alone does not mean they have
no personal or individual freedom.33 The value of the ‘we’ for the Tojol ab’al performs a
crucial role for individuals once decision-making must be practiced. Even when the
tojolabales want to take a decision as individuals it must be shared with the rest of the
community because the decision of one can affect the whole community. The principle of
correspondence we analyzed the Andean Indigenous observed, the tojolabales on their part
put it into practice as well. Then, it is vital to have the consent of the community first
before making a decision by myself alone.
Lenkersdorf affirms that this communal consent could be interpreted by Western
thinkers coming from an individualistic culture and society as a lack of individual freedom.
34

However, just because Western thinkers have taken the ego or the ‘I’ as a primary factor

to achieve liberty, no person started his/her own life alone. Coming from a reality where the
‘we’ is of no value when taking political decisions seems unreasonable for the tojolabales
since human beings are meant to live with others, co-exist among differences, in order to
survive. Just because the Tojol ab’al community does not put the isolated ‘I’ first does not
mean they do not value personal liberty. Thus, the issue here is to think critically about
engaging with the notion of the ‘we’ from which a new definition of liberty arises. This

The communal ‘we’ does not give place to the ‘I’ as an auto-sustained individual subject. The importance
of the ‘I’ inherited from Western tradition is overcame by the communal idea of survival. As Lenkersdorf
states in Filosofar en clave tojolabal, “[t]he WE, then, does not erase the individual, but gives it space to fulfil
its full potential.” (2005: 13). Thus, to survive as a community is to cooperate and act towards one another in
the spirit of the ‘we.’ The ‘I,’ then, is respected as part of the 'we.’ Carlos Lenkersdorf, Filosofar en clave
tojolabal, Miguel Ángel Porrúa, México, 2005. Hereafter cited as “FCT” followed by page number. All
translations are mine.
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does not only require questioning the Western definition of personal liberty but opening
ourselves to an unknown communal liberty.
Another aspect that can be criticized of the Tojol ab’al ‘we’ is the restrictions that it
represents to the outsider. In order to be part of the community you must accept the
communal life. This demands a commitment to the ‘we’ lived by the community. A
foreigner cannot violate the Tojol ab’al ‘we’ without the consent of the community. Once
they accept the stranger to belong to the communal ‘we’ there appears for the outsider the
first opening to a careless reality in globalizing contexts. However, the recognition of the
foreigner to be part of the community leads him/her to an opened communal ‘we’
sustaining and continuing a mutual existence among differences.
In his opinion, and after visiting the Tojol ab’al community, Lenkersdorf knew it
was fundamental for him and those who joined him on the journey to Chiapas, Mexico, that
they should interact with the community in order to know it truly. This was crucial to
prevent judging from an outside perspective. Thus, Lenkersdorf became the student of a
new culture. He learned that to be part of them he must open himself to the unfamiliar. He
writes,
In other words, when we entered the country of the WE, we entered
as simple students, eager to learn because we know nothing. We are
beginners with a fundamental question. From our point of view,
there are two questions that we have to answer: Will our minds be
flexible enough to open up and grasp the otherness of the unknown
culture? […] Will we be able to become partakers of the WE or will
our I hinder our entry?35
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Encountering with the ‘we’ represented a challenge to Lenkersdorf, although it would be
the beginning of a more familiar reality than the one proposed by egoistic thinkers. This
encounter with the tojolabales would be the beginning of a shared, collective, and
cooperative dimension of reality. Lenkersdorf was a Western thinker in a non-Western
reality. He had to learn as a student. The lack of understanding of the ‘we’ sustained by
cultural standards learned by Western understanding of the communal live presented the
following question: how to move toward thinking beyond the prejudices scripted in the
minds of Westernized people who had no previous experience on a communal live
distinguished by the ‘we’?
2.5. How Communal Life Is Lived
The communal life as it is projected by the Tojol ab’al, K’iche’, and Andean communities
embodies a challenge to monocultural realities. As Meza Salcedo argues,
The Mayan – Tojolabal – world and the Incan – Quechua – world,
worlds still unknown to many, have a cosmovision, and
consequently, an experience of the world that can be found in their
language still in force, but above all in their own living, a
cosmovision very different from the monocultural cosmovision that
is known and proposed as a paradigm by the current processes of
globalization.36

One of the problems of the monocultural cosmovision proposed by globalization, for
instance, is permeating the reality of pluricultural and even plurinational countries (as they
are Guatemala, Peru, Mexico, Brazil, and others) and create of them members of an
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universalization starring Western civilization.37 In such a context, plurinational countries
has to assume the role of being part of a culture erasing cultural differences in order to
eliminate poverty from the map. The problem is that the idea of development or progress
has little to do with the Indigenous sense of community.
In his article “The Future of Indigenous Parties in Latin America” the political
scientist Raúl L. Madrid states that “[a]lthough the vast majority of the population of Latin
America is at least partly of indigenous descent, most Latin Americans identify as mestizo
(mixed), rather than as indigenous.”38 They do not want to be identified as Indigenous since
most Indigenous people live under the poverty line according to an study conducted by the
World Bank.39 In such a context, “[e]ven people who speak an indigenous language and
maintain traditional indigenous practices and customs often prefer to self-identify as
mestizo.”40 As it seems, it is saner to assume a ‘folkloric’ vision of Indigenous customs,

Here I use Gerónimo Romero Huayna’s (2007) definition of globalization: “Globalization is an ambiguous
concept in itself, probably as ubiquitous as that of development that influenced the countries of the southern
hemisphere with negative consequences at the end of the 20th century. In what sense is it ambiguous and
ubiquitous? It is a process that influenced by the incessant development of modern science and technology,
brings with it the uncertainty of its trends, its changes announce and hide the dominance of science and
technology as the absolute dominance over human society and civilization. It also makes effective for the first
time the universalization of Western civilization that was an unfinished and unrealized dream of the
modernity of the 20th century, in which we could conceive forms of imperialism in the relations between
technologically developed societies and cultures and the less developed ones that aspired to become more just
and modern societies.” (2007: 31-32). Gerónimo Romero Huayna, La globalización: Una plataforma de
exclusión de los pueblos indígenas, Fondo para el desarrollo de los pueblos indígenas de América latina y el
Caribe, La Paz, Bolivida: 2007. Hereafter cited as “LG” followed by page number. All translations are mine.
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traditions, and cosmovision rather than committing to the simple way of life most of them
own in order to survive as a community.
For instance, for the Tojol ab’al, there is no private property.41 The earth is property
of no body. As Lenkersdorf states, “the soil, the land represents Our Mother Earth who, of
course, is not owned by anyone, just as our mother is not owned by anyone. Selling her
would turn her into a prostitute.”42 Thus, how citizens could become rich and experience
the ‘economic benefits’ of globalization in a community where the land is not meant to be
sold nor exploited? Faced with the need to get out of economic poverty, the Indigenous
proposal is not attractive. However, the problem of globalization looks also unattractive to
most of the Indigenous communities. In La globalización: Una plataforma de exclusión de los
pueblos indígenas (Globalization: A Platform of Exclusion for Indigenous Peoples), Gerónimo

Romero Huayna states,
According to studies and research, poor populations have been
identified as those who do not have electricity, have rustic housing,
do not have water and sewage services and are fed with products
they produce (barley, quinoa, chuño, etc.), do not have adequate
education. This definition contrasts with a disproportionate
perception of the population's daily life. For the indigenous people
there are no poor people and this way of qualifying the only thing it
does is to deepen the exclusion, motivating the indigenous people to
leave their customs and their food diet, they must consume what
there is in the market and stop eating what they produce so as not to
be poor.43
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Fondo para el desarrollo de los pueblos indígenas de América latina y el Caribe, La Paz, Bolivia: 2007.
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The Indigenous would continue to be considered ‘poor people’ as they continue living the
way they do. In the background, what is globalization doing in such situation is
homogenizing what is culturally, economically, and in its cosmovision heterogenous and
diverse. What need to appreciate those who advocate or defend a globalized world are the
benefits of the Indigenous sense of community. Against a globalization proposing an
economic prosperity only benefiting transnational interests at the expenses of the exclusion
of native peoples, the latter can demonstrate to the world the advantages of practicing not
only the Indigenous economic life but also its judicial and socio-political organization.
In the economic realm, each one of the members of the Tojol ab’al community who
harvest the land sees the soil as ‘Our Mother Earth’ since she does not belong only to the
farmers who harvest but to every creature who exists and benefits from all she has to offer.
The economy is adapted to the intrinsic relationship between the ‘we’ and ‘Our Mother
Earth.’ There cannot be authentic communal economy without a dependable sense of ‘Our
Mother Earth.’ For instance, when two commoners greet each other, they wonder about the
status of their milpas. 44 They do not ask about your milpa but about ours. This central
relationship between the commoners and the communal ‘we’ is resembled by their
communication and the way they manage the soil. Even though the soil is not worked by all
the members of the community but by a few of them, the whole community recognize the
land does not belong to the commoners but to the communal ‘we’ as all are benefited by

As Analisa Taylor (2017) states, the “milpa is a cornfield, intercropped with beans, squash, and a wide
variety of other useful plants” (p. 47). Thus, the milpa is not a monoculture, but a polyculture; it represents
one of the characteristics of the codependent Indigenous communal life. See Analisa Taylor, "Milpa:
Mesoamerican Resistance to Agricultural Imperialism," Modern Mexican Culture, The University of Arizona
Press, 2017.
44
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what it has to offer. Thus, there is a codependent and complementary relationship between
‘Our Mother Earth’ and the whole community.
The second dimension that is benefited from the Indigenous communal sense is the
judicial system.45 Before a Western legal system that separates the criminal from the
community to pay for his/her crimes, the Indigenous legal system preserves its communal
sense by reintegrating the lawbreaker to the community. Further, if one of the members of
the community commits a legal crime, the community, affected by the action of the
criminal, identifies itself with the illegal action of its member and decide what punishment
will impose on him/her.
Because of its communal nature, the Tojol ab’al community has no prisons in its
village since incarceration impedes or delays the active participation of the member(s) in
the ‘we.’ So, the criminals must pay their faults collaborating with the communal ‘we’
through supervised works. To ground justice on the ‘we’ means to accept the responsibility
to pay the fault in a social context both communal and familiar. In this case it is the
moment when the criminals find themselves reintegrated to the communal ‘we.’
In the Tojol ab’al justice, as Lenkersdorf writes, “[t]he entire community brings
together the roles of victim, judge and jury.”46 Differently, to be a criminal in the Western
and globalized world is a misfortune because the criminal is not allowed to be accompanied
or attended by and in the community. The prison becomes the new ‘community’ where the
rules are dictated by a sovereign. The problem behind this Western type of punishment is
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that the prisoner does not feel support in the same manner as it is exercised in the Tojol
ab’al context, for example. For the tojolabales, it is ordinary that the community feels
responsibility to decide over the penalty it will be inflicted on the criminal so both the latter
and the community recognize and pay the crime against and as the ‘we.’
Carlos Lenkersdorf points out that the Tojol ab’al community is not “interested in
punishing, nor does it intend to take revenge on the damage suffered. […] Prison
punishment would separate criminals from society and family. Society is diminished by
two members and families are impoverished because no one will fill the work of the
incarcerated.”47 This level of justice questions the Western notion of criminal justice which
separates the criminal from his/her community. As Enrique Dussel states in his book
Twenty Thesis on Politics,
For example, in modern law - with its long history that begins with
Roman or medieval law - those who kill another are imprisoned,
sometimes for life. Among Mayans in Chiapas, those who kill
another member of the community are punished, in the first place,
by having to cultivate the land of the deceased in order to feed the
family that has been left without sustenance.48

As it seems, the Tojol ab’al has a more rational, humane, and saner judicial system than the
practiced and financed in Western civilization. The tojolabales recognize that the criminal
must pay his/her crime in the community, cultivating the land, and assuming the
responsibility of correspondence. Further, if the criminal has killed another person, neither
the community nor the family of the deceased lose; what is made as a member of the
community is seen as an act of the ‘we,’ and must be paid as such. Engaging the dynamic
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cosmovision of the Tojol ab’al legal procedure is guaranteeing a judicial system which
ensures community’s welfare by leaving no one behind.
The third dimension of the Tojol ab’al communal lifestyle ought to be distinguished
is their socio-political system. Between the years 1970 to 1980, while working with the
Tojol ab’al-Spanish and Spanish-Tojol ab’al dictionary, it was written the following phrase:
“ja ma’ ‘ay ya’ tel kujtiki mandar ‘ay kujtik’.”49 In English it means: “In the community
WE are the commoners who control our authorities.”50
As a peculiar feature of Tojol ab’al politics that contrasts with Western democracy,
community members choose their political representatives without them having to go
around campaigning. The process of electing political candidates takes place at community
meetings where the community nominates, confirms, and chooses the next members who
will represent and serve the community politically. As the community is the actor choosing
the political authorities, the community always constitutes the political power that controls
the authorities, that is, the internal government.
Political power belongs to the community and is never exercised in meetings where
the community cannot participate. Differently, the internal government, who is the
representation of the whole community, has the obligation to hear and respond to the
community’s orders, demands, and requests made and reached by consensus. Political
authorities are named ‘ja ma’ ‘ay ya tel,’ which means “those who work.”51 In this Mayan
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community, the internal government is obliged to obey and observe the community’s orders
by what is called ‘command by obeying.’52
2.6. Command by Obeying
To be obedient is neither synonym with the subjugation of the community under the
political authorities nor with a possible privilege the community has to misuse its political
power. In a different way, to be politically obedient is to recognize that the community has
full capacity for self-government and that it does not need political leaders to make
decisions on behalf of the community without first consulting it. Thus, first and foremost,
the political authorities are proposed and elected by the community. In this way, the
political authorities recognize that they have received a political responsibility on behalf of
the whole community. Second, political authorities from the beginning have been mandated
or instructed by the consensus of the entire community. Hence, third and finally, the task of
the political authorities is to ensure that each member of the community assumes political
responsibility and participates in community meetings so that decisions made can have the
consent of each individual.
It is common that in community meetings the views of certain members do not
agree. Thus, the task of the political authorities is to ensure that even if the views are
different, agreements can be reached. In this way, it is avoided that the community cannot
reach agreements and that the decisions taken do not have communal significance. In
Dussel’s words the above can be translated into the following:
But the wills of each of the members of the community could also
be directed toward the acquisition of their multiple and opposing
As Dussel states, ““Command obeying” is an indigenous phrase popularized by the Zapatista rebellion in
Chiapas.” TTP, 19.
52
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private interests, and in this way the potency or strength of the will
of the individual can annul that of others, thereby resulting in
impotence, or a lack of power. On the other hand, if these wills were
able to join together their objectives, their purposes, and their
strategic ends, then they would achieve – by organically combining
strength in a “common-will-to-live” – a higher degree of power-aspotential (potentia).53

In this way, the political authorities should direct and supervise the communal meetings to
avoid that the disagreements between members become a communal impotence where there
are internal divisions due to lack of consensus.
In this way, obediential power must be the motto or adage of the communal political
authorities. The political authorities must humbly assume their political office. Their job is
mainly to obey the community as a whole because they know that without the community
they would not be working as political authorities. Furthermore, since commanding by
obeying ensures that what the community agrees upon is executed and implemented,
political leaders must be faithful not to some members but to the community as a whole. In
this way, political leaders are prevented from becoming corrupt, since the corruption of the
communal political system begins when the communal agreement is not put into practice.
2.7. Delegation of Political Power
Some might be wondering why the Tojol ab’al community delegates its power into the
hands of a few. Usually this endangers the political participation of the rest of the
community since they do not have as much political presence as the representative in
meetings or political affairs. This can make 1) the representative feel that his/her political
duty first depends on his/her capacity to make decisions on behalf of the community as if
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he/she were the center of political power and 2) the community, for its part, disengage from
their political responsibility. However, the reality is and can be different if we look at it
from the Tojol ab’al perspective. To have direct democracy, that is, active political
participation of the community, it demands the assistance of the political representatives,
members of the internal government, who recollect the demands of the community to make
possible the institutionalization of political power (potestas, as Enrique Dussel calls it).54
However, the delegation of political power requires obedience from the internal
government so that it can work. In fact, it is obligatory or mandatory that the community
participate. But the reality in most of our societies is that the internal government does not
always obey the community’s demands, and so political power becomes corrupted,
monopolized, and fetishized by the few. Dussel states,
The political as such is corrupted as a totality when its essential
function is distorted or destroyed at its origin. [...] This originary
corruption of the political, which I will call the fetishism of power,
consists of the moment in which the political actor (the members of
the political community, whether citizens or representatives)
believes that power affirms his or her subjectivity or the institution
in which he or she functions – as a “functionary," whether it be as
president, representative, judge, governor, soldier, police officer –
as the center or source of political power. This is how, for
example, the State comes to be affirmed as the sovereign and as the
power of last resort, and this represents the fetishism of the power
of the State and the corruption of all those who seek to exercise
State power defined in this way.55

For the Tojol ab’als, the obedience of the representatives and the whole community towards
the ‘we’ is always building the socio-political system. The mere existence of the ‘we’
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compels any non-participatory political activity where the community only accept or reject
political candidates without having meetings where the community postulates, confirms,
and chooses the political authorities. The non-participatory political system that tends to
perform political decisions supported by political representatives elected but not proposed
or suggested by the community does not practice the obedience of the representatives since
in this political system, most often than not, the candidates are those who have more money
to fund their political campaigns, instead of being those who interact more and have a direct
relation with the community and its demands.
Further, the hierarchical political system of Western societies tends to perform,
decide, and make political decisions without first and foremost consulting the community.56
On such a model the institutionalization of political power (potestas) becomes corrupted.57
On the other hand, the Tojol ab’al internal government understands that political power is
the community. The political authorities have the responsibility and commitment to ensure
and collaborate with the communal ‘we’ since the community is “the cause or the origin of
the fact that they are authorities.”58 In this sense, the community becomes the center or the
origin of political power.

56

I understand that consulting the whole community every time political decisions are to be made can be
utopian as there are countries that are too big to be able to hear the voice of all citizens before decisions are
made. However, I understand that this should not be a reason that justifies making decisions in the internal
government without taking into consideration that those most affected, the people, had no voice or vote in the
decision-making process. Perhaps the use of technology can help us in consulting the entire community or the
creation of smaller and autonomous political communities interconnected with others can present political
solutions to be considered in order to avoid citizen indifference to politics and the self or auto-empowerment
of politicians in decision making.
57

We will delve more in depth on the meaning of potestas in the next chapter (chapter 3).
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2.8. Conclusion
Lenkersdorf’s analysis in his Filosofar en clave tojolabal and “Nosotros otra realidad”
brings forth the advantages of the communal ‘we’ through a social analysis that leaves no
other possibility for thought than the admiration of the socio-political aspect of the ‘we.’
Considering the hierarchical scheme that characterize Western politics, the question is how
the Tojol ab’al community will teach us, Westernized subjects, to accept a horizontal
political scheme. What is curious here is that the ‘we’ does not tend to remove the
differences between the communal members. Although it was not explained in depth, the
milpa resembles the ‘we' because it is not monoculture. Plurality is part of the Indigenous
communities’ lifestyle, language, and cosmovision we examined in this chapter.
Also, when one study more closely the Tojol ab’al, K’iche’, and Andean
communities one finds that the system brought by the communal life can be studied as the
ideal example of political power where the power comes from the community. The
participation of the community shall not be impeded by hierarchical structures whose
organization might constitute the ideal environment for separating the community from
their participation. This statement does not mean that all hierarchical structures are a
disaster or the foundation for corruption but that hierarchical structures whose structure is
not designed to hear the civilians falls short to practice participative democracy; the main
motor that is moving the Indigenous sense of community.
How would one get engaged in the Tojol ab’al, K’iche’, and Andean reality if not
were through their teaching for us a more individualistic society? The prevailing or
dominant society, as Lenkersdorf calls it, neither knows the Indigenous sense of
community nor seeks to engage into a more horizontal and pluralistic political dimension,
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one capable of inciting no egotism or selfish behaviors but participation and consensus.
However, it is through the study of Indigenous words such as -tik, k’ax k’ol, and runa/jaqi
and the manner all of them resemble the Indigenous communal reality that we might
recognize how a more collaborative and participatory system works and benefits the
economic, judicial, and socio-political system of a community.
In the following chapter we will delve into details of what the concept potentia and
potestas mean. These concepts are fundamental to understand why the community is
political power when it is at the center of political actions. Is it correct to affirm that
political power belongs to the internal government and that only them are responsible for
assuming the reins of democracy? What about the community? Does it have political
power? Is there a solution for avoiding corrupted, monopolized, or fetishized political
power? The answers to these questions will be instrumental to comprehend what Enrique
Dussel means by people and what similarities and differences stem from the Indigenous
sense of community.
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Chapter 3. The Concept of People in Light of the Indigenous Communal
Sense
The importance of the WE exclude the emphasis on the individual, in particular the
ego. The WE absorbs the individual and requires their incorporation into the US, by
requiring the contribution of each, woman or man, to the grupo nosótrico [us the
group]. This contribution requires and mobilizes all the capacities of the challenged
individual. The WE, then, does not erase the individual, but gives it space to fulfil
its full potential.
-- Carlos Lenkersdorf, Filosofar en clave tojolabal
3.1. Introduction
One finds in contemporary Western and Latin American political philosophy various
powerful engagements with the idea of community. On the Western side, we can read the
work of Maurice Blanchot, Antonio Negri, Jean-Luc Nancy, and others. On the Latin
American side, we can read the work of José Carlos Mariátegui, Carlos Lenkersdorf,
Orlando Fals Borda, Ernesto Laclau, Juan Carlos Scannone, Luis Britto García, Enrique
Dussel, and others.59 For the aims of this chapter, I will focus on the work of E. Dussel who
has developed his concept of people on the communal basis presented in the previous
chapter (chapter 2) on some Latin American Indigenous sense of community. The analysis
of the Tojol ab’al, K’iche’, and Andean Indigenous communities and the sense of
communal ‘we’ developed by Carlos Lenkersdorf will permeate our insight and follow up
Dussel’s analysis on the concept of people. I will also present in this chapter Dussel’s
questioning of political system that seek to keep citizens politically silenced by not
practicing political consensus. Dussel’s analysis of this type of political system will be
illuminated by the political Indigenous perspective since the concept of people is meant to
be localized and analyzed in the light of Latin America, where the presence of many
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Indigenous communities is influential and unquestionable.60 Furthermore, in order to
express the importance of constructing a new political constitution based on the active
participation of the members of the community, Dussel challenges the current political
system that is taking for granted the influence of the indigenous traditions in the way
politics can be practiced in Latin America.
Since for Dussel the community is synonym with power, the adoption of the
Indigenous communal sense is key to understand Dussel’s meaning of power (potentia) and
political power (potestas). It is worth noting, the community does not depend on how many
members it encompasses. That is, quantity is not essential for understanding what Dussel
means by people but knowing what are the demands of the unified persons and the motif
that keep them together working for the same aim.
The idea behind political power cannot be comprehended if we do not acknowledge
along Dussel that reaching a communal agreement is characteristic among certain
Indigenous communities. Dussel adopts the notion of consensus as the key piece for
communal systems to practice their political power. Although the practice of consensus is
hegemonic by nature, it forges more power to the community than the decision made by
one person. In such a line of thought, to understand that people and power are two
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(78); and in the other, Costa Rica and Panama, each of which has 9 Indigenous villages and then El Salvador
(3) and Uruguay (2)” (2014: 12). CEPAL, Los pueblos indígenas en América Latina: Avances en el último
decenio y retos pendientes para la garantía de sus derechos, Naciones Unidas, Santiago, Chile, 2014. All
translation is mine.
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dimensions of the Indigenous life is to accept the mutual dependence between members of
the community in political power.
The concept of people points toward the fact that we are dependent of others to
survive. Then, individualism or any type of exclusion to the notion of ‘we’ in unity and
correlation falls short to explain our necessity to interact with other human beings; the basis
on which politics is and should always be founded, according to Dussel. Thus, Dussel’s
tendency to ensure the continuity and unity of our life with that of others points toward the
obligation philosophers have for explaining reality from the simple to the complex; a
scheme where material reality takes the lead.61
As Dussel appreciates it, in the absence of a political constitution where the people
could enjoy the active participation lived as in the communal ‘we,' it is fundamental to
reveal the reason of the detrimental reality people are experiencing “to have their demands
fulfilled.”62 Because of this, and the lack of trust and credibility to politicians, it has
become increasingly common to witness social protests taking to the streets.63 As it seems,
the movements, groups, and sectors which organize themselves in social protests believe
there is no other option available for them than demonstrating their frustration and urgency
to be taken seriously in the political realm. The concept of people, as Dussel explains it,

By material reality Dussel means human’s basic needs to survive: Water, food, shelter, land to cultivate and
live on, and so on. The concept of people also will resemble the material reality since for Dussel the people
seek the freedom of the oppressed groups through a process of liberation that always needs politics to flourish
and become concrete.
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In Anthony Giddens’ (2000) words, “Nations have lost most of the sovereignty they once had, and
politicians have lost most of their capacity to influence events. It isn’t surprising that no one respects political
leaders any more, or has much interest in what they have to say. The era of the nation-state is over” (p. 26).
Anthony Giddens, Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping our Lives, Routledge, New York, 2000.
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takes meaning specially in the Latin American political system reality through the fact that
people’s “unsatisfied demands” creates “demand-based mobilizations” on their part.64
Another aspect of Dussel’s concept of people I will be focused on in this chapter is
the role of politicians in participating and collaborating closely with citizenry so that
political power be understood as a collaborative work where political authorities are meant
to command by obeying the community.65 Whether political authorities hear the demands
of the community or not will decide the progress and efficiency of politics. After all,
citizens are taking more participation in political arena, and the corruption of government
just calls the attention of the people to get more involved in society.
Finally, to understand the concept of people 1) we must not forget the communal
sense of Indigenous peoples 2) without letting this prevent us from entering into an
increasingly globalized reality where individuality and exclusionary competition is the
order of the day. So, I will use the Indigenous communities as a counterargument against
the growing universalization of non-communal values that are increasingly presented as the
ideal of an interconnected world by technological advances in communication and
transportation accepting a greater expansion of the so-called globalization.
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For more information on the notion of ‘command by obeying’ see section 2.6 of chapter 2 titled
“Delegation of Political Power.”
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3.2. An Imaginary Context66
In order to understand how the concept of people arises, let’s read the following
quote written by Enrique Dussel in the eleventh chapter of his book Twenty Thesis on
Politics, titled “The People: The Popular Sector and “Populism””:
If all sectors of the political community were able to have their
demands fulfilled, there would be no social protest of formation of
popular movements struggling for the fulfillment of their unsatisfied
demands. It is by starting from the negativity of needs – for some
dimension of life, or for democratic participation – that the struggle
for recognition is frequently transformed into demand-based
mobilizations, which do not await justice as a gift of the powerful
but rather seek it as an autonomous achievement of the movements.
In this sense, there could exist as many movements as there are
differential claims.67

Clearly, Dussel is not referring our attention here to the Indigenous socio-political system.
On the other hand, he is exposing a context in which the citizens of a political community,
are divided in different sectors depending on their differential claims. Usually, all these
sectors, movements, groups, etc. fight for their own demands. In this communal live,
political power belongs only to few members of the community called the internal
government, which is constituted by the governor and representatives. Politically speaking,
the community that the internal government manages or governs is not recognized as a
political entity by itself. Thus, whether the community needs political attention or not it
depends on their willing to organize social protests.
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In this section, I will introduce an imaginary context. This serves as a contrast to the Tojolabal communal
live. This imaginary context rises the opportunity to understand Dussel’s quotes on the definition of people
and its derivates. Even though in his book Twenty Thesis on Politics, Dussel brings not an imaginary context,
I think it will facilitate us a new type of antithesis we can use to compare the Tojolabal communal live and the
non-Tojolabal communal live within which the people live in.
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As Dussel emphasizes, these protests are ‘demand-based mobilizations’ by which
the community demands political attention from the internal government to fulfill some
material needs (such as clean water, the opportunity to work their own lands, and so on).
Whether due to some ‘willing to live’ or to achieve some communal participation, the
community mobilizes itself as an entity with the aim of being heard by the internal
government.
The reality is that if the needs of the members are particular and individual, no
consensual agreement can be reached. However, the requests of this community are based
on needs that everyone has as members of the same system. If the reality of the case is that
the members of the community do not have common demands, but are fighting for
particular needs, we should ask ourselves, together with Dussel, the following question:
How can these pass from being a particular claim to being a
hegemonic claim able to unify all social movements in a country at
a given moment? This is a question of moving from differential
particularities to a universal one that encompasses them.68

In other words, if the particular needs of each member of the whole community divide it in
different groups, how all these different groups or movements, following their own
demands, can agree and aim to protest for a ‘universal’ or prioritized demand?69 Dussel
answers to this question by stating the following:

68

TTP, 72.

69

For Dussel this question is central because for a communal system to work, the members should seek the
same end. Reaching a communal agreement is fundamental to the survival of the community because it
ensures that the demands of its members are not divided when it comes to presenting them to the internal
government. In an indigenous communal context, if the members of the community do not reach a consensual
agreement, the internal government will not be able to ‘command by obeying’ since it will only attend to the
needs of some but not of others.
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The community, as linguistic and communicative, is one in which
its members can provide reasons to other members in order to arrive
at agreements. Through the use of a wide range of arguments that
represent public rhetorical expressions in reference to the
community of wills (e.g., mythical stories, artistic expressions like
theater, or even the most abstract scientific formulations), consensus
can be reached provided that citizens participate symmetrically.
Such consensuses – which are occasionally unintentional but
accepted by tradition, and as such are no less valid – result in a
convergence of wills toward a common good, and this is what we
can properly term “political power". 70

The differential claims of the groups might be sacrificed to prioritize some demands over
others and to protests for a universal and all-encompassing demand. Regardless of how
many groups, sectors, or movements are involucrate in community’s protests, each group
should set aside its own particular ideologies to prioritize the demands required by the
whole community so that the protest can be effective. It does not matter if they once were
feminists, anti-racists, LGBTQ+ members, Indigenous communities, unemployed people,
environmentalists, or any movement claiming its ‘unsatisfied demands’ and struggling for
some political recognition,’ the priorities of the whole community should unite each of the
separate groups by wisely naming the basic needs that allow not only survival, but the
preservation of all life of which the human being is a partaker. When such a context
becomes possible and real, the community puts into practice the Indigenous sense of
correspondence and communal ‘we.’
As Dussel himself states, the success of the unity of these distinct movements were
produced by two major factors: 1) the ideas of dialogue and translation; brought by
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, and 2) the notion of the prioritization of demands; brought by
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Ernesto Laclau.71 On the one hand, for the Portuguese sociologists Boaventura de Sousa
Santos the demands of different movements and sectors of the political community “must
enter into a process of dialogue and translation, with the goal of achieving an
understanding between movements that nonetheless never represents an encompassing
universal.”72 Discussing and translating the objectives of each group and reforming them to
make them shareable is to produce the unity of ‘the different movements and sectors of the
political community.’ On the other hand, for the Argentine philosopher Ernesto Laclau,
dialoguing and translating the aims and agree on their unity is not enough. According to
Laclau, this could create a group conflict if the movements do not reach agreement to
prioritize some demands over others. Since such clarification explains the success of the
unity of these distinct members with particular demands, and is totally consistent with the
idea of dialogue and translation provided by the Portuguese sociologist, Dussel embraces
the theory that the unity of different sectors occurs when all the demands are encompassed,
giving priority to some of them over others.
3.3. The Hegemonic Demand and the Rise of the People
The result of the collaboration of these two proposals made by de Sousa Santos and
Laclau is what Dussel calls the ‘analogic hegemon.’73 As Dussel states, “through mutual
information, dialogue, translation of proposals, and shared militant praxis, these
movements slowly and progressively constitute an analogical hegemon, which to some
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degree includes all demands but might [...] prioritize some.”74 The analogic hegemon is
hegemonic, since it must be “based on the consensus of the determinant majority.”75 This
unity of movements, as Dussel writes, “construct a “bloc” that comes "from below” with an
increasingly developed national and popular consciousness of the unfulfilled needs and
claims that are assumed with a clear understanding of the demands they entail.”76 To
assume the ‘analogic hegemon’ is to accept the hegemonical relationship between these
movements, sectors, and classes produced by the consensus of the majority.77
In Dussel words,
A hegemonic demand (or a coherently structure group of demands)
is one that manages to unify all claims - or at least those most urgent
for everyone - within a broader proposal. Struggles over demands
constitute political actions, and if these actions achieve the level of
unity, we can say that they become hegemonic. This does not mean
that there are no antagonistic groups opposing minorities whose
claims will need to be dealt with in the future. The fact is that
political action needs to be extremely attentive in observing,
respecting, and including, if possible, the interests of all groups,
sectors, and movements. When an action becomes hegemonic, it
begins to mobilize the power of the community or the people (as
potentia), and the actions of representatives flow toward their
objective with the support of the strength and motivation of all, or at
least the most significant sectors. Hegemonic action is the fully

74

TTP, 72.

75

TTP, 39.

76

TTP, 73.

77

Dussel knows that the process of consensus is a hegemonic practice, that is to say, it presupposes a
relationship of differences where the strongest wins. However, when it comes to prioritizing one demand over
another, as practiced by the Tojolabal community, for example, the members of the community talk and
propose certain proposals to try to convince their peers that their proposal is fundamental and more relevant to
all. Once the members are convinced that some are right about others, the people stop forcing their arguments.
Finally, the proposal that convinces everyone will be accepted unanimously. This process involves strength
but above all wisdom and humility to recognize that there are proposals that are better than others. See Carlos
Lenkersdorf, Filosofar en clave tojolabal, Miguel Ángel Porrúa, México, 2005.
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delegated exercise of power (potestas), and it relies on consensus,
fraternity, and the people as the foundation of power.78

By giving priority to some demands over others emerges what Dussel categorizes as the
people. That is, different groups affected in one way or another by the corrupt exercise of
politics through political authorities come together by a single cause. Examples abound of
the presence of the people in Latin American history. For instance, it was present and
operating “[i]n the process of emancipation from Spain in 1810.”79 Also, throughout our
contemporary history it operates in certain political struggles.80 For Dussel, we must take
account of its existence and recognize its philosophical importance to constructing
philosophical-political theory. In Dussel’s words,
In the process of creating a hegemonic bloc, the need arises for a
category that can encompass the unity of all the movements, classes,
sectors, etc. in political struggle. And so the people is that strictly
political category (since it is not properly sociological or economic)
that appears as absolutely essential, despite its ambiguity (and
indeed this ambiguity does not result from misunderstanding but
rather from inevitable complexity).81

In this way, the people become the philosophical concept capable of categorizing the
encompassing of all the movements present in the social protests of the disadvantaged. This
concept not only takes the form of the courage that the less advantaged give to stand up
against the system that oppresses them, but it also carries with it the organization of a
whole host of groups that disengage themselves from any identity that might divide them in
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order to put into practice the hegemonic demand. The process that takes place when groups
divided by different demands unite to fight for a common cause is the living example that a
process of union in survival and desire to live is reflected as long as we all remember that
we are first and foremost human beings, participants in all of life.
Unfortunately, the people are revolting against a system that does not take them into
consideration. A political system that has benefited from the lack of participation of the
entire community. In this way, the political authorities try to govern the community as long
as the community does not demand that they obey it in everything it asks of them. In other
words, to Indigenous command by obeying is not at the heart of the political system that the
people are facing.82
3.4. The Concept of People in the Midst of Globalization
In view of the lack of attention that the people have, the solution could be that the political
authorities listen to their citizens. In this way, the protests carried out by the people will
come to an end. However, some may be thinking that the fact that political authorities listen
to the people will not prevent the demands of a few from being unsatisfied or that by
‘satiating’ the current needs of the people they will not have new desires in the future. What
if instead of looking for less corruption and access to land and clean water, that is, demands
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As Dussel himself writes, “‘Command obeying’ is an indigenous phrase popularized by the Zapatista
rebellion in Chiapas, Mexico” (TTP, 19). It is practiced by listening “to the one before you” (TTP, 26).
Nevertheless, the people, although sovereign to politically administer themselves in consensus, are obliged to
manifest themselves in social protests demanding the fulfillment of their unfulfilled demands since the
political representatives or governor within the political reality they are living in do not practice the
obediential power. As it was concluded by Dussel, “Obediential power would therefore mean the delegated
exercise of the power of all authority that fulfills the political justice claim. Put differently, this characterizes
the upright political actor who aspires to exercise power in order to have the necessary subjective position to
struggle in favor of the empirically possible happiness of a political community, a people” (TTP, 26).
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for survival, now different groups come together to look for a more interconnected and
economically efficient system like the one proposed by globalization?
As Gerónimo Romero Huayna states in his book La globalización: Una plataforma
de exclusion de los pueblos indígenas, "[g]lobalization, understood as economic, cultural,
social and political homogenization, promotes and generates universal values and rights and
does not respond to the demands of the world's indigenous movements.”83 However, we
should not succumb to temptation of demonizing globalization. It is true that globalization
as a complex system has not responded to all the claims Indigenous communities have.
That “[g]lobalization, understood as the capitalist commodification in a worldwide
dimension, homogenizes everything in accordance with the interests of transnationals and
imperialist powers; it is exclusive and will deepen the process of exclusion and denial of
Indigenous People.”84 However, as Romero Huayna himself states,
In the new global context, there is a favorable international scenario
for Indigenous Peoples, which creates conditions for the
development of international public law, which allows dialogue and
generates proposals in terms of the rights of Indigenous Peoples
before governments and heads of state.85

If we can identify the people in struggles to defend the Indigenous communities and their
lands against exclusionary capitalist and globalizing visions that ignore the Indigenous
cosmovision, we must also understand that among globalization (as a complex system)
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there has not yet been an effective dialogue that obeys the demands of the Indigenous. For
this reason, the struggle of the people in favor of Indigenous communities can be
understood as a search for dialogue in which the ignorance of transnationals and imperialist
powers should be confronted and interpellated by the call of the Indigenous and less
favored peoples.
Moreover, according to Dussel’s theory of the people, we will not find the people
fighting only for the interests of a few. For Dussel there is no such thing as a people who
seeks things that will not favor those most affected since the people is the ‘social bloc of
the oppressed.’86 In other words, the people are a community of oppressed individuals who
respond to the needs of the less fortunate. Thus, although globalization as a model has
focused on the claims of capitalist powers, it could collaborate with Indigenous
communities and being favorable to the demands of the less advantageous. As Romero
Huayna states,
Indigenous Peoples fight for the respect of the land, conservation of
the environment, practice of cosmovision and religiosity with the
Pachamama, they fight for the application of ancestral rights to the
human person and the new concepts of interrelations of the social
and the political have given them sufficient reasons to organize and
wake up in the globalized world, which nevertheless gives a
renewed space to the claims of Indigenous Peoples in different
dimensions.87

Therefore, we must understand that although the demands of the people can evolve and
become more and more complex, the people will always emerge as a social bloc or

For more information on the people as the ‘social bloc of the oppressed’ see chapter 4 of this thesis project,
section 4.1. “The People as Social Bloc.”
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community that will meet the needs of the less advantaged. Then, the problem is that as
long as the people are not heard and the separation between the people and the political,
economic, and social authorities persists, the people will remain oppressed.
3.5. The Oblivion of the ‘We’: The Origin of the Scission of Political Power
For Enrique Dussel, “[t]he pueblo [people] establishes an internal frontier or a fracture
within the political reality.”88 That is, the people are distinguished from the political system
and separated from the political activity and, at the same time, are the ‘fracture within the
political reality’ since they do not follow the political ordering of the system. Nevertheless,
before this situation, the people behave in an interesting manner; they act akin to the
Indigenous communal sense. The problem is that the Tojol ab’al ‘we,’ for instance, is
unrecognized by the political system taking political authority as a task of few members. In
such a context, the socio-political participation of the tojolabales in the communal ‘we’ is
unrecognized. The idea of a political system where political authorities command by
obeying the community does not fit in. For this reason, if we make a comparison between
the political system from where the people arise as a social bloc of the oppressed with the
Tojol ab’al community, we will conclude that the people demand from their system what is
not in its political constitution; thus, the people are mere citizens protesting. That is, the
system from where the people come possesses a political participation that is limited to vote
during the elections, always waiting four years to feel that they are actively participating in
politics – a responsibility delegated to the elected government. This produces an ‘internal
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frontier’ between the accountability of political authorities and the community. For this
reason, the people are considered outsiders in this political system.
Given this situation, the political system becomes a non-hierarchical system where a
constitution that allows the participation of the community in the decision-making process
as the members of the Tojol ab’al community practices does not exist. The political system
in where the people show up does not expect from their citizens and internal government to
decide together as a ‘we.’ Communal consent is not fundamental for this political system
where the people is not considered the power of political power. In this way the
organization of the political system is conducive to the emergence of the people, to rise up
as a powerful community, capable of surviving as a bloc with the purpose of its voice being
heard, assumed and integrated. If this happens, the political system will be closer to the
ideal of a community of the ‘we.’89
3.6. The Power of the People: From Potentia to Potestas
Since the Indigenous socio-political system puts the community at the center of its
organization, for Dussel, politics is forged by the desire and choice to survive as bloc or
community. This desire (potentia) to survive or exist as a community becomes the origin of
power who makes politics possible. Potentia as power is the first manifestation of the
capacity or potential the community possesses to govern and practice its emancipation from
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I make my own the words of Alejandra Aquino Moreschi (2013) when she states that the ideal of
communal everyday life is not always expressed as a perfect reality. According to her, "Communality is
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systems that tend to exclude.90 In this way, the people as a communality represent the
potentia to exercise political emancipation. In Dussel words:
I will use therefore the term potentia to refer to the power that is a
faculty or capacity inherent in the people as the final instance of
sovereignty, authority, governability, and the political. This power
as potentia – which spreads like a network over the entire political
field, and within which every political actor is a node [...] – develops
on various levels and in various spheres, thereby constituting the
foundation and essence of all that is political. One might even say
that the political is the development of political power in all its
moments.91

In this manner, potentia is the potential of a community, sector, social bloc, and each group
to become a political actor. However, this capacity might become active and operating in
order to exercise its political power. In this way, we could say that the Indigenous
communities are an excellent example of what it means to be potentia. Indigenous are
trying to survive as a whole. To achieve their goal they not only show their capacity to live
in community but also to translate their desire to live in a political system where life takes
precedence. Because for Dussel “politics is an activity that organizes and promotes the
production, reproduction, and enhancement of the lives of the members of that
community,”92 the Indigenous communities, with their lifestyle and organizational system,
present a model of what political ideal is.

As Alejandra Aquino Moreschi states, “The community is an emancipatory thought and practice” (LCES,
12). It is an emancipatory thought to the extent that it reflects along with others and an emancipatory practice
since it presents the necessary tools and practical means to exercise resistance and community mobilizations.
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Dussel highlights that by nature humanity is essentially a social being that needs
each other to be born and grow. In fact, we need each other to survive and occupy a place
in the political society. In this manner, potentia, which is the ‘foundation and essence of all
that is political,’ based in this social relation and interaction with others and prioritizing the
demands that ensure life in all its forms becomes operative and active. And when potentia
operates actively, it is transformed into potestas, that is, active political power:
If potentia is power in-itself, then potestas is power outside-itself
[...]. The process of passing from a fundamental moment (potentia)
to its constitution as an organized power (potestas) begins when the
political community affirms itself as an instituting power [...],
thereby deciding to heterogeneously organize its functions in order
to accomplish diverse ends.93

Following what Dussel states here, there is a necessity to move forward from potentia to
potestas when the people bring to concretion the ‘organized power’ operating in political
reality to accomplish their goal.94 Further still, Dussel states that the institutionalization of
the power is fundamental in order to allow the political power to concretely appear in
socio-political reality. It could be said that this process occurs almost naturally in the
Indigenous communities when they develop around a system where everyone is supported
and corresponds to the communal needs. However, in the case of the people, the transition
from having the capacity (potentia) to have a political impact to having it (potestas) takes
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According to Enrique Dussel, politics, when institutionalized (potestas), ensures and makes real
community’s will-to-live (potentia). For better or worse, potestas can become a self-interested or egoistic
power to dominate the community and maintain power over it. However, the continuous participation of the
community and that it works hand in hand with its political leaders avoids that political powers are used for
the benefit of only a few and therefore, that politics is corrupted, fetishized and monopolized.
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time and depends on whether there is a collective agreement on the issue that everyone
wants to address, resolve or cover.95
It is worth clarifying that it is not enough for the power of the people to be
institutionalized. For it to work, it must be practiced in the community, since this has been
its main driving force. In addition, the desire to achieve unity and protest as a social bloc
must keep the members alive and active. In this way, when the unity of the members of a
social bloc demonstrates a relationship of unity comparable to the Indigenous communal
sense and takes action either in the streets, in the plazas, or in a public space to demand
dialogue, attentive, and committed listening to the political authorities, then we can affirm
that it has passed from potentia to potestas.
3.7. Conclusion
To avoid political impotence is to prevent the political scission caused by the
separation of the people from their political power. Because the community and the internal
government have equal political authority in the Indigenous communities are discussing in
this thesis project, there is no other ideal as the one proposing the internal government
making political decisions with the consent of the whole community. The Indigenous
communities considers how fundamental is the participation of its members and know the
benefits of hearing and sharing personal impression in communal meetings.96 Through this

On the transition from potentia to potestas Dussel states that “The institutionalized community is one that,
having created the mediations that make possible the exercise of potestas, splits off from the merely
undifferentiated community. This is a scission between potentia and potestas, in other words, between the
power of the political community as central, original, and fundamental (the hidden ontological level) and the
heterogeneous differentiation of functions through institutions that allow power to become real, empirical, and
feasible, which allow it to appear (as phenomenon) in the political field” (TTP, 20).
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political participation, a decision made by the whole community is achieved and the
community exercises its political power moving from potentia to potestas.
In the imaginary context that we discussed in this chapter, we were able to confront
a political system where not only do the inhabitants have no participation, but they have
experienced political power as something that belongs to the rulers/political authorities.
Thus, if community members wanted to participate, they had to organize social protests so
that the government would listen to them. At that time, the political participation of the
citizens was an exceptional state to the one the political system was used to, since there was
a quasi-permanent split or scission between the community and the internal government.
Hence, as the different movements, sectors, classes, etc. unified their voices to fight for a
priority demand, they acted as a Tojol ab’al ‘we’ in the midst of a system/reality where the
sense of Indigenous community is not the norm.
This is how the people emerged: a social bloc of oppressed people who wanted to
rise up so that they would no longer be trampled on by the ignorance of the government
system. This social bloc behaves as a community where the demands of the participants
must be translated, and agreement reached on which needs are a priority. Usually the needs
that have the highest priority are those that have to do with the preservation of life in all its
forms. However, as we saw, the community may want to be part of a globalized system, for
instance, to have greater political reach, benefit from and participate in technological
advances, and be taken into consideration in the midst of global scales that usually ignore
the voice of the worse affected (i.e. Indigenous communities). The idea, therefore, is not
that the demands of the people be kept in having clean water, land to harvest and live on,
etc. but that they can become demands that involve political participation in global
50

economy where the interconnectivity of the global system is enriched by different
worldviews. The task of the people will always be to raise the voice of the less fortunate.
In the next chapter we will follow Dussel's analysis of the concept of people and
how it becomes the ‘Other’ of a closed system in corrupting politicians who have
appropriated the political power to use it for their own benefit. Presenting the people as the
‘Other’ will allow us to understand the urgency of practicing the “obediential power.” We
will also be able to understand how using political power as a quality belonging only to the
political authorities corrupts the system and prevents the people from being able to stop
being the social bloc of the oppressed.
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Chapter 4. The Origin of the People as the Other than Political Power
The question of whether or not it is possible to “change the world without taking
power” has from the outset been posed incorrectly. Power is not “taken” as though
it were a thing, an object at hand, or a well-bound package. Power is a faculty
belonging to the political community, to the people. The power that appears to be
“taken” is merely the mediations or institutions of the delegated exercise of this
fundamental power.
-- Enrique Dussel, Twenty Theses on Politics
4.1. Introduction
In the following chapter we will study the arise of the people as the wake-up call or
warning signal given to the internal government. The people will always emerge as a
product of the fetishization, corruption, and monopolization of political affairs and when
the community has not political participation. Hence, to understand what the people are, we
must first understand why the corruption or fetishization of political power creates the ideal
environment for the uprising of the people – the social bloc of the oppressed.97 For
instance, the action of ‘taking’ political power as an instrument or means to order the
community represents by itself the scission between the political community and the
internal government because political power ‘is a faculty belonging to the political
community.’ That is, political power is not a ‘thing’ we should take but the community as a
political actor and therefore, as an end.
Because fetishization and reification of political power produces or originates the
scission between the community and the internal government, the community ought to
participate always in the institutionalization of political power and be obeyed by the

For Dussel, a fetishized political power exists when political representation has been ‘taken’ by the internal
government (e.g. presidents, governors, representatives, legislatives, etc.) as an instrument to govern the
community and exercise political power without the participation of the community.
97

52

internal government whose main duty is to observe the demands of the community and
ensure its participation. When political power is not fetishized a) the community does not
become the people and b) ‘obediential power’ (command obeying the community) becomes
a possibility. In light of the above, it should be clarified that according to Dussel, the
community has the vocation of politics. If this vocation is suppressed by a corrupt political
system, the most affected groups will rise up against the system. In other words, the people
are the negatively affected community who rise up against the corrupt political system to
achieve a new system. Hence, the people are the ‘Other’ of an enclosed and Totalized
system.98 However, that the people are oppressed and excluded does not mean that they do
not constitute or forge power. People’s will to survive ends with fetishist potestas
demanding a ‘new system’ that is always made possible after what Dussel calls ‘the state of
rebellion,’ by which the ruling or prevailing system is overthrown.
4.2. The People as Social Bloc
According to Enrique Dussel, the people are a ‘social bloc’99 that behaves as a ‘whole’ and
a ‘collective actor.’100 Hence, they are a whole because they “can be both integrated and
disintegrated.”101 That is, the people are integrated because they arise at a certain point
(when the community becomes exterior to the political system, and is then, despised and
oppressed by it) and disintegrated since they end to exist when the corrupted system is

It is worth clarifying that although Dussel takes the idea of ‘otherness’ or the ‘Other’ from the philosopher
Emmanuel Levinas, when talking about the people Dussel makes his own the concept of the Other. In this
way, the philosophical connotations that the concept of the Other will have in Dussel's philosophy will be
different or will take on a particular meaning to those proposed by Levinas.
98

99

TTP, 75.

100

See, TTP, 21, 80, and 82.

101

TTP, 75.

53

overthrown and command by obeying is put into practice. On the other hand, the people are
a ‘collective actor’ since, by acting as a community of the ‘we,’ they maintain an
organizational coherence that allows them to behave as an actor or unified whole. This
happens since humans need others to survive and preserve life.
In terms of the communal sense, Dussel emphasizes that “since human communities
have always been threatened by their vulnerability to death and to extinction, such
communities maintain an instinctive desire to remain alive.”102 And indeed, it is the
community’s desire to survive that shapes the will-to-live of the people. In Dussel words,
“[t]his desire-to-live of human beings in a community can be called will. The will-to-live is
the originary tendency of all human beings.”103 It is this same desire to survive that
motivates the people to fight despite being excluded by the system in which they find
themselves.104 However, because they are repressed to exercise their vocation and political
faculty amidst a corrupted political system, the people are ‘victims.’ Dussel writes, “[t]he
victims of the prevailing political system cannot live fully (this is why they are victims).
Their Will-to-Live has been negated by the Will-to-Power of the powerful.”105 The people,
hence, are outside of the political realm since they cannot exercise their political faculty; it
was usurped by the corrupted internal government and the creation of the corrupted,
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monopolized, and fetishized potestas.106 In such a context, political power is ‘owned’ by
the corrupted internal government.
4.3. The People as the Other of the Corrupted System
Based on the community’s will-to-live, singular subjects forge their demands into what
becomes the community. Within the framework of the corrupted political system, the willto-live becomes the force by which the people constitute an ‘internal frontier or a fracture
within the political reality.’ In Dussel’s words, “The first determination of power (as
potentia) is will, and this is what the people recover in conjunctural moments of great
transformation.”107 At this point people serve as the demarcating frontier of the political
system; a frontier or fracture within the political reality revealing itself as the ‘Other’ of the
Totality of the system. For this reason, Dussel writes,
The political system, the existing order, finally closes in on itself as
a Totality. Emmanuel Levinas, in his work Totality and Infinity: An
Essay on Exteriority, describes this process of the totalitarian
totalization of the Totality “as the exclusion of the Other”, which
Marx completes by adding those oppressed by the system. The
people therefore maintain a complex position. On the one hand, they
are the social bloc “of the oppressed” within the system (for
example, the working class), but they simultaneously comprise the
excluded (for example, the marginalized, the indigenous peoples
who survive through self-sufficient production and consumption,
etc.).108

Fortunately, people’s will-to-live is the only power (potentia) that a fetishized potestas cannot surmount.
Potentia allows the community to overcome death as a collective. This situation follows with what Dussel
addressed earlier. He said that the people are power (potentia) since they have the capacity to preserve life.
Comparing the victims of the prevailing system with the Tojol ab’al socio-political system, the latter survive
since it favors the participation of the whole community. That is, the Tojol ab’al community is neither
enclosed nor enslaved in itself by corrupted rules and institutions (potestas) that do not favor the well-being of
the entire community. On the other hand, the people have no participation in the system they found
themselves, thus, are excluded and ignored by the socio-political system.
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As a social bloc of the oppressed, the people are within the system, working for the system
from below. However, they also are the excluded social bloc since they have no part in
political actions. For this reason, the people long for a new system, one in which they
exercise their political faculty and are obeyed by political authorities.109
Hence, the people are the Other. According to Emmanuel Levinas, the Other is the
‘other than Totality.’ The Totality as a whole, as an encompassed multiplicity of individual
pieces, does not need anything that remains outside of it. In order to be aware of what is
outside, it must open itself up to the ‘new,’ to the ‘different.’ And it is outside the totality
that the Other is found. In Totality and Infinity: An Essay of Exteriority, Totality has the
characteristic of being a whole enclosed in the same.110 Hence, Totality is the same, while
the Other is the different. Totality, by encompassing what is the same, excludes. That is,
because Totality represents sameness or totalization, it is finished, terminated, and closed to
the different Other.
Dussel uses this analogy of the Totality and the Other to explain what happens in a
fetishized and corrupted political system. And since Dussel understands that Levinas’
concept of the Other is an equivocal concept, that is, that it has two or more possible
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meanings, he dares to elaborate a theory of the people in which it is the excluded and
oppressed Other.111
Basically the process of liberating the people as the Other will work as long as the
political authorities, inscribed in a Totalitarian and closed system of corrupt politics,
assume responsibility for-the-other, the excluded, the oppressed, the least listened to.
According to the philosopher François Raffoul, writing on Levinas’ notion of responsibility
towards the Other in the fifth chapter of his book The Origin of Responsibility titled
“Levinas’s Reversal of Responsibility,”
One finds in Levinas’s thinking of responsibility a sustained attempt
to overcome the very horizon of egology. Indeed, far from assigning
responsibility to the actions of an agent on the basis of the freedom
of the subject, following an entire tradition, Levinas breaks with
such a horizon […] and re-conceptualizes responsibility as a being
“for-the-other”.112

Responsibility is for the Other, as exterior to me. This notion of responsibility, whose main
purpose is ‘for-the-other’, overcomes any attempt to perpetuate egology. How so? The
Other is a mystery inasmuch as I recognize myself unable to understand the dreams,

In the second volume of his book Para una ética de la liberación latinoamericana, entitled “Eticidad y
moralidad,” Enrique Dussel assumes the duty of developing the bases of an ethics of metaphysics or alterity
capable of presenting the task of Latin American philosophy. Already in the last and sixth chapter, entitled
“El método de la ética”, Dussel expresses that his philosophical position with respect to the Other was
inspired by the thought of Lévinas. However, Lévinas could not overcome the European context of his
philosophizing since for him “the Other is ‘absolutely’ another. He therefore tended to be mistaken. On the
other hand, he has never thought that the Other could be an Indian, an African, an Asian” (Dussel, 1973: 161).
Interpreting the Other beyond Lévinas, Dussel affirms that the “Other, for us, is Latin America with respect to
the European Totality; it is the poor and oppressed Latin American people with respect to the dominant and
nevertheless dependent oligarchies” (1973: 161). This second volume will conclude with the presentation of a
morality of liberation and the methods to be employed in the ethics of liberation, which will lay the
foundations that the Latin American philosopher of liberation will have to assume, if his/her philosophical
project is in favor of the poor, miserable and forgotten Other. Enrique Dussel, Para una ética de la liberación
latinoamericana Tomo II, Siglo XXI Argentina Editores S. A., Córdoba, Buenos Aires, 1973.
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desires, hopes of the Other, until he/she opens him/herself to me by speaking or interacting
with me. On such a model, the ‘I’ is defined by its relationship with the Other. In fact,
Levinas is not arguing that the ‘I’ has no relevance in the ‘I-You (Other)’ relation,’ but that
through responsibility the ‘I’ cannot be defined by itself but by the Other who questions,
interrogates, and demands from the ‘I’ attention; responsibility.113
This responsibility for-the-other takes on certain nuances in the indigenous
communal sense. For instance, in his book Philosophizing in Tojolabal Code (Filosofar en
clave tojolabal), Carlos Lenkersdorf states that the ‘I’ and the ‘Other’ only exist because of
the ‘we.’114 This occurs in such a way that for the community as a whole, it does not take
precedence to speak of a relationship between ‘me’ and ‘you,’ but rather of an
interconnected relationship that is reciprocated by the ‘we.’ Lenkersdorf himself describes
it as follows: “The predominance of the ‘we’ excludes, in our opinion, the preponderance of
the individual, regardless of whether it is I, YOU, HE, OR SHE.”115 The primacy of the
‘we,’ therefore, involves the subjective individual self, in a communal relationship that

Following Levinas’s idea of responsibility in Ethics and Infinity, responsibility ‘for-the-other’ is defined
“as responsibility for what is not my deed, or for what does not even matter to me.” (1985: 95). The radicality
of this manner of understanding responsibility lies in on the basis of accepting the Other from his/her
exteriority. Even when his/her presence bothers me, I have an ethical responsibility towards him/her.
Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, Conversation with Philippe Nemo. Translated by Richard A. Cohen.
Duquesne University Press, 1985.
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surpasses any possible closed loop present in the I-YOU relationship.116 For this reason,
Lenkersdorf concludes that the “I-You […] does not equate to the WE.”117
4.4. From Fetishized Power to People’s Advent: The Origin of the New System
In Latin American Ethical Philosophy: From Erotic to Pedagogical (Filosofía Ética
Latinoamericana: De la Erótica a la Pedagógica), Enrique Dussel highlights the
(paradoxical) relation between the people and the oppressed of the system. The people, as
the oppressed of the prevailing system, represent the ‘new system.’ Because they are not
tied to the old system (then, freed from political corruption) and are longing, desiring,
hoping, and projecting (proyectando) the future, the people embody what the new is. 118 In
Dussel words,
The dominator tends to dominate the system, the totality which is
the fruit of a process of anterior liberation that has led him/her to the
power [que lo ha llevado al poder]. For this reason, the one who
dominates cannot but think that the better time is the past: all past
was better, and all future is risky to his/her power, domination.
Through the entire human history, always [desde siempre], future
belongs to the oppressed, because he/she is exterior to the system;
because he/she is the one who has nothing to lose; because he/she
simply has nothing [porque simplemente no tiene nada].119
As it seems, the ‘we’ disappears the ‘I-You’ relation by conforming a structure where everyone
understands itself in and for the ‘we.’ I argue that even though the new responsibility that Levinas introduces
to Western thinking overcomes the prevailing ‘egology’ of Western philosophical and ethical tradition and
serves as an analogy or example of how to end the supremacy of the ‘I’ over the (oppressed) Other, the Tojol
ab’al ‘we,’ and Dussel’s concept of people, should not be understood from a Western standpoint where the ‘I’
preserves its validity over the ‘we.’ On such a model, Enrique Dussel interprets the concept of the Other in
new ways and possibility that fit with the Latin American reality. In this manner, also, I argue that the concept
of people presents a new alternative to the ‘I-You’ and ‘for-the-other’ relationships in order to develop a
socio-political system where the Other possesses characteristics typical of Latin America.
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As Dussel emphasizes, the people, coming from below, have nothing to lose looking for a
better future. The future belongs to them since they constitute a temporal dimension of the
possibility that only those who have nothing perceive. The people may say: “It might not
work. But it may be worth trying before losing even the only thing that remains, that is,
hope!” In the quest for the new system, the people overcome the old system, closed upon
itself in the past. And even when the new system is impossible until it shows up, the people
have no system since they are excluded from the prevailing one. The people have nothing
to lose trying to overcome the corrupted system. On such a model, the future looks as the
only thing the people have.
The new beginning the people are striving for questions the vain hope of the
powerful to perpetuate the old system, the fetishized one. However, the people are always
ready and prepared to create a new system since they were suffering the consequences of
corruption. Thus, the people imagine a new possible system while they inhabit on the
outskirts of the current one. As Dussel writes, the capacity to imagine a new system makes
of the people a futural community: “The people are outside the system at a certain level,
and, because they are outside the system, they are in the future.”120 That is, the people are
not tied to the prevailing system, they are in the future, in the possibility, in the coming of
‘something different’ and ‘new.’121 The people, as the excluded and oppressed, are futural
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because in their hope for a better system they break up the prevailing one, demanding a
novel one; a ground-breaking one.122
When the political system fetishizes potestas, people’s advent or rise becomes
inevitable. Dussel affirms that, on such a context, the power of the whole political
community is the people.123 As the people represents the ‘we’ in a non-Indigenous sociopolitical structure, they cannot rely on the internal government. On the contrary, it is up to
them whether a new system is possible. As Dussel states,
If potentia is a capacity belonging to the political community, which
now in a position of dominance has organized potestas in favor of
its interests and against the emergent people, then hyperpotentia is
the power of the people, its sovereignty and authority [...] that
emerges in creative moments of history to inaugurate great
transformations or radical revolutions.124

The people, as futural, have the power to ‘inaugurate great transformations and radical
revolutions’ by themselves. That is, the people confront the manner in which the current
fetishized political system understands power as something manipulable or that can be
taken. Hence, people’s will-to-live is revealed as the “anti-power in the face of the power of
domination.”125 Hyperpotentia, as Dussel understands it, “effectively carries out the
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transformation of potestas, now in service of the people.”126 In such a context, the
institutionalized and fetishized political power (potestas) becomes confronted by people’s
power; which is manifested as a ‘state of rebellion.’
4.5. The State of Rebellion and the Case of Puerto Rico
The ‘state of rebellion’ is the people’s hyperpotentia in action.127 People's hyperpotentia is
expressed in diverse manners. Whether through passive or aggressive street protests or by
using mass social networks to bring a strong and clear message to politicians and the
corrupt system, hyperpotentia seeks to create a new system. The behavior of the people’s
hyperpotentia depends on the common objective they strive for and the way they want to
achieve it. Also, because states of rebellion are expressions of liberation, they can be
different depending on the type of oppressed that make up the social bloc. Therefore, in
order to be able to specify with an example what hyperpotentia consists of and what
nuances it can take, let's look at the case of Puerto Rico in the summer of 2019.
On July 10, 2019, the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested
Puerto Rico’s former government officials after alleged corruption and embezzlement of
federal funds directed to help the health and public education system in the archipelago.128
In addition, the same day, the leak of private messages that the governor hold with
members of his political cabinet using the app Telegram where they ridiculed and mocked
citizens, members of his own political party, and the victims of hurricane Maria – one of
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the most devastating Hurricanes Puerto Ricans have ever experienced in modern history –
became public.129 Both events aroused the people of Puerto Rico to being socially
organized.
On July 13, 2019 the people took to the streets to demand Puerto Rico’s governor
resignation. Despite the protests, Rosselló did not obey the people.130 On July 17, 2019 the
people got up again. Hundreds of thousands of citizens went to protest to Old San Juan,
Puerto Rico’s capital, to call for the governor's resignation.131 Even though the governor did
not aim to resign, on July 24, 2019, the will of the people brought down Rosselló’s
government power by forcing him to relinquish his political representation of Puerto Rico
as governor.
In Dussel words, the will of the governor “ended up being annulled by a prior will:
the will of the people, power as hyperpotentia.”132 Through the state of rebellion, which
were expressed by the people taking to the streets en masse, it might be stated that
The people, then, appears as a collective actor – neither substantive
nor metaphysical, but conjunctural – as a “bloc” that manifests itself
and disappears, in possession of the new power that lies below the
praxis of anti-hegemonic liberation and the transformation of
institutions.133
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The people disappear ‘in possession of the new power,’ the new system, since
hyperpotentia, which Dussel considers to be “the transformative capacity [...] of the
people,”134 once overcome the old and fetishized system becomes a liberatory power
capable of creating a new political system.
As Dussel states, “hyperpotentia, however, only exists in itself.”135 It arises as a
state of rebellion formed by the people to question the existence of the corrupted organized
political power (potestas). Thus, once the corrupted political power is brought down by
hyperpotentia its task is accomplished. Now, at this point, “[o]nly triumphant social
movements or an exceptional political leader [...] know what is feasible or infeasible or
how to stretch the rope of transformation to the maximum without breaking it.”136 That is,
the state of rebellion is just a liberatory power appearing at critical political moments to
solve certain problems. Once the political problem is solved, the state of rebellion ends, and
a new system appears as a possible reality; it only would be made possible by ‘triumphant
social movements or an exceptional political leader’ whose political agenda places the
community and its political participation first.
4.6. Conclusion
As we saw in this chapter, the people appear outside the corrupted system as the Other. The
responsibility of the internal government towards the people is to hear their plea demanding
the fulfillment of unfulfilled demands. Nevertheless, this does not occur since by the
Totalization of the corrupted political system the people are excluded and oppressed. For
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that reason, the people organize themselves to defeat the system through what Dussel called
a ‘state of rebellion.' This is exactly the opportunity for the people to reach the new system.
In fact, it could be the beginning of a system created from and for the community, for the
‘we.’
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Chapter 5. Conclusion: The Possibilities of a New System
When we speak of struggle and we mention the people we mean the vast
unredeemed masses … those who long for great and wise changes in all aspects of
their life; the people who, to attain those changes, are ready to give even the very
last breath they have when they believe in something or in someone, especially
when they believe in themselves ... In terms of struggle, when we talk about the
people we’re talking about the six hundred thousand Cubans without work ...; the
five hundred thousand farms laborers who live in miserable shacks ...; the four
hundred thousand industrial workers and laborers ... whose salaries pass from the
hands of the boss to those of the moneylender ...; the one hundred thousand small
farmers who live and die working land that is not theirs, always looking at it with
the sadness of Moses gazing at the promised land ... the thirty thousand teachers and
professors ...; the twenty thousand small business men weighted down by debts ...;
the ten thousand young professionals people ... anxious to work and full of hope …
These are the people, the ones who know misfortune and, therefore, are capable of
fighting with limitless courage!
-- Enrique Dussel, Twenty Theses on Politics
Following Castro, Dussel emphasizes that usually the people do not enjoy responsible
listening to their shortages by those who represent them, turning them into victims of the
system. Even though the democratic or participatory exercise of power must facilitates the
attentive listening of the various voices composing the system, allowing political power not
to be unidirectional from ‘top to bottom’ but ‘horizontal,’ some governments do not aim at
bringing the citizenry the opportunity to exercise its political power beyond voting at
political elections. For this reason, we must seek to reach the stage in which the unsatisfied
demands of citizens are heard by the political authorities that govern them so that the
communal system proposed by the Indigenous communities evaluated in this thesis is
viable in Latin American countries.
Throughout this thesis work we study the Indigenous sense of community and how
it permeates the socio-political system of Indigenous communities in Latin America
(Chapter 2). Also, we recognized that the people, understood from a Latin American
Indigenous standpoint, is a category that encompasses the unity of all the movements,
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classes, sectors, etc., in political struggle in favor of and created by the must oppressed by
the system (Chapter 3). Finally, following Dussel’s approach to Levinas’s notion of the
Other, we concluded that the people are exterior to the corrupted institutionalized political
power (potestas). In this manner, the people are the victims, the Other of the system. By
means of people’s will (hyperpotentia), a state of rebellion happens as the origin of the new
possible system. This moment of revolution presents an opportunity for the people to be
heard by the internal government (Chapter 4).
Whether the people will always act as the Other of the system depends on the
collaboration between the internal government and the people to overcome the fetishized
political system. Also, as long as there is no sense of political consensus as it is practiced
by the Indigenous communities, the people will always practice hyperpotentia and express
their demands through a state of rebellion.
5.1. New Challenges
At the conclusion of this thesis project, I understand that the people will always express
their demands through the ‘state of rebellion’ if the internal government and the community
are divided. But, given this situation, I ask myself the following: Is there another option for
the people to express their demands to the internal government without a ‘state of rebellion’
having to occur? For Dussel, the people are the victim, the Other of the system. The split
between the community and the political representatives is not caused by the community,
but by the internal government that has institutionalized political power (potestas) with the
intention of practicing the ‘will to power.’ Thus, to avoid a ‘state of rebellion,’ the internal
government must exercise its political responsibility to ‘command by obeying’ the
community.
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One of the challenges that the internal government will face if it decides to obey the
people could be how to practice the ‘power of obedience’ in large communities where there
are citizens living in distant or difficult to reach places. That is, if the internal government
wants to practice the art of ‘command by obeying’ following the model practiced by the
Indigenous communities, especially the Tojol ab’al, in which political decisions are always
made by consensus through public meetings, where the political authorities must obey and
put into practice the decisions made by the entire community. So how do you practice the
Tojol ab’al style of consensus, for example, in communities with too many inhabitants?137
Will community consensus only work in small communities? Could it be that the use of the
media will allow us to politically interconnect communities with too many inhabitants?138
Secondly, the new political system that practices Indigenous communal sense could
function by following the system of voceros (spokespersons) practiced by Venezuela and
called the “Organic Law of Popular Power”. The voceros are citizens who commit
themselves to public policy to serve as a bridge between the community councils and the
state. In this way, they give attention to the people by giving “voice in local, state, regional,
and national governance.”139 Since in this context the community will be represented by
voceros, it is easier for large and/or remote communities to participate politically in both
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“Chavista theory of transition towards the communal state,” openDemocracy, July 22, 2015.
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/chavista-theory-of-transition-towards-communal-state/
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local and state politics. In this way, political power does not end up being monopolized as it
usually happens when only political authorities make important decisions and execute
projects for communities without first consulting them.
Finally, I ask myself: Since we want a political system where obediential power is
put into practice through the political authorities, how do we educate and train the political
authorities so that they are prepared to carry out such work? The total renovation of the
political system is imperative so that no citizen is left out of political participation. In this
way we prevent the people from rising up as the forgotten and oppressed Other of the
system. Once politics is not corrupted and the whole community participates in political
matters through political decision-making by consensus, the idea of a just politics will not
only be an ideal but can be made concrete in reality.
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